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Reparations for ‘guilty victims’: Navigating Complex 
Identities of Victim-Perpetrators in Reparation Mechanisms 
Luke Moffett, Lecturer, School of Law, Queen’s University Belfast (l.moffett@qub.ac.uk) 
Abstract: Reparations are often declared victim-centred, but in transitional societies defining 
who is a victim and eligible for reparations can be a politically charged and controversial 
process. Added to this, the messy reality of conflict means that perpetrators and victims do 
not always fall in two separate categories. Instead in certain circumstances perpetrators can 
be victimised and victims can be responsible for victimising others. This article explores 
complex victims, who are responsible for victimising others, but have themselves been 
unlawfully victimised. Looking in particular at the 1993 Shankill bombing in Northern Ireland, 
as well as Colombia and Peru, such complex victims are often seen as ‘guilty’ or ‘bad’ victims 
undeserving of reparations. This article argues that complex victims need to be included in 
reparation mechanisms to ensure accountability and to prevent their exclusion becoming a 
source of victimisation and future violence. It considers alternative avenues of human rights 
courts, development aid, services and community reparations to navigate complex identities 
of victim-perpetrators. In concluding the author finds that complex identities can be 
accommodated in transitional societies reparation programmes through nuanced rules of 
eligibility and forms of reparations. 
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acknowledgement; Northern Ireland; Peru; Colombia. 
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 ‘[T]he nearest relative of someone who died as a result of the conflict in and about Northern 
Ireland, from January 1966, should receive a one-off ex-gratia recognition payment of 
£12,000.’1 
"There is no difference in a mother's tears. There can be no hierarchy of grief.""2  
 “It's blood money. It truly is the wages of sin… What this says to me is that the Government 
is prepared to pay Thomas Begley's family £12,000 for murdering my mum and my dad. … 
Those bombers set out to commit carnage, to bomb and to brutalise and to murder. How can 
their families be compensated for their murderous intent? … I will never accept this money. 
To accept it would be to besmirch my parents' memory, to acknowledge that they are just the 
same as the scum that murdered them.”3 
“I have often acknowledged, in my own case of losing my wife in the Shankill bomb, that the 
mother of the bomber Thomas Begley hurts much like myself. … I believe Mrs Begley should 
receive all the help society can give her to help her deal with her tragedy; but I have always 
stopped short of suggesting that that should be monetary in nature. There is something about 
money that changes the dynamic of how we view situations like this.”4 
On a sunny Saturday afternoon in October 1993 a bomb ripped through a busy fish-and-chip 
shop in Belfast, killing ten people and seriously injuring 57 others. Two members of the 
Provisional IRA had planted the bomb in an attempt to kill members of the loyalist UDA group, 
who they thought were meeting in the room above the takeaway. The bombers intended to 
give a warning to those in the fish-and-chip shop, but the bomb prematurely detonated killing 
one of the bombers, Thomas Begley, and a UDA member, Michael Morrison and his family, 
as well as seriously injuring the other bomber, Sean Kelly. In 2009 proposals by the 
Consultative Group on the Past to address the legacy of the Troubles, included a recognition 
payment for every family who lost a loved one. However, it was met by protests that the family 
of Thomas Begley and other paramilitaries who were killed would be eligible for the payment, 
and as a result the proposals were abandoned.5 The quotes above reflect this contention 
                                                             
1 Report of the Consultative Group on the Past in Northern Ireland, (2009), p92. 
2 Reverend Lord Eames, Co-Chair of the Consultative Group on the Past. Olga Craig, 'It's blood money 
– truly the wages of sin', The Telegraph, 31 January 2009. 
3 Michelle Williamson, daughter of civilians George and Gillian Williamson who were killed in the 
Shankill bombing in October 1993. Olga Craig, 'It's blood money – truly the wages of sin', The 
Telegraph, 31 January 2009. 
4 Alan McBride, who lost his wife Sharon and father-in-law Desmond Frizzell (both civilians) in the 
Shankill bombing on 23rd October 1993. Alan McBride, Hierarchy Of Victims: A Question of Hierarchy, 
WAVE Trauma Centre Newsletter, February 2009, p26. 
5 Protestors carried placards proclaiming ‘The Wages of Murder is £12,000’ and ‘Terrorism Pays 
apparently’. See Owen Bowcott, Protests disrupt launch of Northern Ireland Troubles payout proposals, 
The Guardian, 28 January 2009. 
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between proposed legal boundaries, moral invocation of victimhood and the personal views 
of two victims in providing reparations to perpetrators who suffer. 
Recognising who is a victim in the aftermath of mass violence and conflict can be 
morally and politically controversial, owing to contested narratives of victimhood. The image 
of victims as ‘innocent’ is often used to deny victimhood to those who suffered, due to their 
background or conduct, or to legitimise violence against individuals or groups.6 In reality 
individual identities in protracted armed conflicts and political violence can be more complex 
than the binary identities of victim and perpetrator, where individuals can be both victimised 
and victimiser over time.7 This is only brought into sharper relief with the issue of reparations, 
which seek to acknowledge individuals as victims through tangible and symbolic remedies 
made by those responsible for their suffering. Reparations have increasingly become a 
normative part of transitional justice processes in remedying victims’ harm, complementing 
more perpetrator-focused criminal trials. Transitional justice itself has been purported to be 
‘victim-centred’, but this raises questions as to who is recognised as a victim and which voices 
are prioritised in shaping and benefiting from reparation policies. With the growing use of 
reparations to deal with collective violence, their remedial nature has come into conflict with 
political discourses of who is seen as deserving, threatening to derail fragile and long term 
peace processes, such as in Peru and Northern Ireland. 
The purpose of this article is to challenge simplistic discourses of victimhood to be 
more composite in addressing victimisation and responsibility by including victim-perpetrators 
in reparation mechanisms. It is hoped that such an approach can navigate such issues of the 
eligibility of victim-perpetrator or complex victims for reparations without being a source of 
victimisation and future violence. This article begins by outlining how victimology has grappled 
with complex victims and political discourses use of victimhood to establish legitimacy and 
avoid responsibility. Developing Bouris’s ‘complex political victim’ this article explores how 
                                                             
6  Mike Morrissey and Marie Smith, Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement: Victims, 
Grievance and Blame, Pluto Press (2002), p4. 
7 See Tristan Anne Borer, A Taxonomy of Victims and Perpetrators: Human Rights and Reconciliation 
in South Africa, Human Rights Quarterly 25(4) (2003) 1088–1116. 
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reparations for complex victims are theorised in the literature and practice of transitional 
justice. Victim responsibility has been insufficiently examined when addressing collective 
violence. This piece argues that while international and human rights law recognise all victims’ 
right to reparation, political discourses during transitions from authoritarianism or conflict 
distinguish victim-perpetrators, continuing the narrative of violence through political, moral and 
legal means. The second part of this article evaluates how complex victims have been 
included or excluded in reparation programmes in different transitional contexts. This article 
identifies that most of the reparation mechanisms and literature on transitional justice 
concentrates on state responsibility, leaving little space for complex victims who do not fit 
within such a narrative of the past. The final section evaluates alternative approaches in 
including complex victims in remedial or assistance programmes. This article hopes to 
untangle the messiness of identities in conflict to return to a nuanced notion of justice, which 
can more effectively address the past. As Bouris highlights the dangers of excluding complex 
victims, this article suggests ways in which victim-perpetrators can be included within 
reparation programmes without undermining goals of accountability or reconciliation. 
A. Conceiving victimhood and responsibility 
Victimhood and responsibility for victimisation seem diametrically opposed; this section seeks 
to theoretically map out the two areas under ‘innocent’ and ‘complex’ victims. For the purposes 
of clarity ‘innocent’ victims refers to those individuals who are not members of armed groups, 
i.e. civilians, with ‘complex’ victims denoting those who have been victimised, but are 
responsible for victimising others, with victims referring to both categories. 
1. Innocent victims 
In the real world individuals are not always recognised as victims, owing to prevailing political 
or moral ‘labelling’ of who a victim should be and who deserves recognition.8 The victim label 
can bestow sympathy, praise, or benefits on an individual as it recognises that they have 
                                                             
8 Richard Quinney, Who is the Victim? Criminology 10 (1972) 314-323, p321. 
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suffered.9 As such, Christie postulates the ‘ideal victim’ as society’s construction of what a 
victim should be.10 The ideal victim is innocent, vulnerable, very young or very old, and a good 
citizen who has been attacked by a bad offender who is a stranger.11 This construction of the 
‘innocent victim’ serves to contrast the ‘wicked’ perpetrator, insurgent, or terrorist, who is 
distinguished as evil, uncivilised, and deserving of punishment or reciprocal violence.12 This 
characterisation fits into retributive discourses, simplifying and distorting the occurrence of 
violations where such identities do not always exist.13 For those individuals denied recognition 
as victims, because of their past actions or association, it may cause stigma, emotional 
trauma, and self-blame. Yet, there is a danger of individuals as ‘ideal victim’ to be represented 
as passive and vulnerable, unable to help themselves or contribute to wider political or legal 
processes.14  
The political construction of ‘innocent’ victimhood is equally utilised on the international 
stage in response to collective violence and conflict. The use of ‘innocent’ or ‘real’ identification 
of victims within conflict and post-conflict societies can perpetrate a very powerful moral 
conception of victimhood. 15 Belligerents in conflicts can portray themselves as collective 
victims to benefit from the victim label and to be seen as the ‘good guys’, deserving of 
sympathy and support, and innocent of any crime.16 Such a perspective can drift into ‘moral 
relativism’, whereby an individual or group can blame their situation, context or structural 
factors for committing atrocities.17 As a result it can legitimise violence against individuals, 
                                                             
9 David Miers, Taking the law into their own hands: victims as offenders, A. Crawford and J. Goodey 
(eds.), Integrating a Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice, Ashgate: Aldershot (2000) 77-95, p78. 
10 See Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, British Journal of Criminology 17(1) (1977) 1-15. 
11 Ibid p19. 
12 David Becker, Elizabeth Lira, María Isabel Castillo, Elena Gómez, and Juana Kovalskys, Therapy 
with Victims of Political Repression in Chile: The Challenge of Social Reparation, Journal of Social 
Issues, 46 (3) (1990), 133-149, p135. 
13 Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, Victims and Transitional Justice: Voice, Agency and 
Blame, Social and Legal Studies, 22(4) (2013) 489-513, p502. 
14 Anne-Marie McAlinden, Deconstructing Victim and Offender Identities in Discourses on Child Sexual 
Abuse: Hierarchies, Blame and the Good/Evil Dialectic, British Journal of Criminology, (2014) 54 (2), 
180-198, p190. 
15 See Erica Bouris, Complex Political Victims, Kumarian (2007). 
16 See David Bar-Tal, Lily Chernyak-Hai, Noas Schori, and Ayelet Gundar, A Sense of Self-Perceived 
Collective Victimhood in Intractable Conflicts, 91(874) International Review of the Red Cross, June 
2009, 229-258. 
17 McEvoy and McConnachie n.17, p502. 
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impose collective guilt on groups and people, or deny recognition of certain victims. This 
conflicts with the more objective, normative wrongfulness of such atrocities in international 
law, where victimhood is based on harm, rather than responsibility or belonging to a particular 
group. In the case of the Shankill bombing, the civilians killed, such as Michelle Williamson’s 
parents or Alan McBride’s wife and father-in-law, were individual citizens carrying out ordinary 
daily tasks, unlawfully killed by harm caused by the bombers Thomas Begley and Sean Kelly. 
McEvoy and McConnachie argue that the juxtaposition of victimhood and perpetration in 
‘claim-making’ on identity and justice are even more explicit in transitional contexts than in 
domestic justice, as ‘the ‘innocent’ victim is placed at the ‘apex of a hierarchy of victimhood 
and becomes a symbol around which contested notions of past violence and suffering are 
constructed and reproduced.’18 This is apparent in the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland or the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict, where different actors use their past communal victimisation to 
construct moral justification and legitimacy of their violence against the other side.19 Such 
construction of victimhood and legitimacy can leave little space for complex identities. 
Moreover, the conceived vulnerability of victimhood and weak inclusion of victims’ rights in 
transitional justice mechanisms enables political actors to appropriate victimhood for their own 
gain. 
2. Complex victims 
This article takes a more nuanced victimological examination of ‘complex victims’, who are not 
just vulnerable objects victimised by others, but appreciates the context of such victimisation 
in light of their agency, in that they can also be responsible for their actions. Analysis of a 
victim’s responsibility for causing harm to others or themselves is not new, but has waned in 
recent decades. Early positivist research in victimology was concerned with understanding 
victims’ responsibility in their own victimisation, looking in particular at their actions, 
                                                             
18 Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, Victimology in transitional justice: Victimhood, innocence 
and hierarchy, European Journal of Criminology, 9(5) (2012) 527-538, p532. 
19 See Bar-Tal et al. n.20; Morrissey and Smyth n.8, p5; and Luc Huyse, Victims, in D. Bloomfiled, T. 
Barnes and L. Huyse (eds.), Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook, IDEA (2002), 54-65, p62. 
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characteristics, and circumstances that provoked the perpetrator to commit an offence.20 
However, positivists failed to appreciate the impact of social structures upon victimisation, and 
resulted in ‘victim blaming’.21 More critical accounts of victimology have attempted to uncover 
hidden or unrecognised victimisation by examining the ‘role of the law and the state in the 
victimisation process as well as the potential for human actors both to sustain and to change 
the conditions under which they act.’22 Through this perspective the concern for recognition 
and fair treatment of victims better reflects the relational or ‘lived reality’ of individuals and 
groups that suffer as a result of a crime.23 Yet, such concerns in domestic victimology may not 
capture the experience of victimhood in collective violence.  
In practice collective violence can often be protracted and complex, preventing the 
identities of victim and perpetrator from fitting into neat, distinct morally acceptable 
categories. 24 As Borer points out victims and perpetrators of collective violence are not 
homogenous, nor always diametrically opposed, but can coincide.25 The ‘messy’ reality of 
these situations or ‘grey zone’ can mean that there are complex identities of victim-
perpetrators who can exist at the same time, such as child soldiers, or evolve over time by 
being victimised one day, but carrying out a retaliatory attack the next.26 This is not to mitigate 
their personal responsibility for such harm, nor to tarnish those victims who turn the other 
cheek and become ‘moral beacons’ in their community,27 but to understand the personal, 
social, and political context in which victimisation occurs.  
To ignore the responsibility of complex victims perpetuates a universal definition of 
victimhood that everyone was victimised and suffered in equal amounts.28 Yet this denigrates 
                                                             
20 See Hans Von Hentig, The criminal and his victim: Studies in the socio-biology of crime, (Archon 
1967). 
21 Rob Mawby and Sandra Walklate, Critical Victimology: International Perspectives, (Sage 1994), p11-
12. 
22 Mawby and Walklate ibid., p177. 
23 McEvoy and McConnachie n.22, p530. 
24 Collective violence is used here to cover war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. 
25 Borer n.7, p1091. 
26 McEvoy and McConnachie n.17, p494; and Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, (Abacus 1989). 
27 See Laurence M. Thomas, Suffering as a moral beacon: Blacks and Jews, in H. Flanzbaum (ed.), 
The Americanization of the Holocaust, Johns Hopkins University Press, 198–210 (1999). 
28 Borer n.7, p1111. 
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the personal, traumatic, and continuing suffering of many individuals. Morrissey and Smyth 
suggest that such universalistic definitions of victimhood of ‘we are all victims’ also has the 
effect of allowing those responsible to escape their guilt or shame, and ‘promote a culture of 
powerlessness and undifferentiated chaos.’ 29  Furthermore in relation to reparations, if 
everyone is considered a victim, such a broad definition can inhibit efforts to identify those 
most in need and who continue to suffer from the effects of violence.30 The risk with complex 
victims is that by recognising perpetrators as victims it could be used to legitimise their 
violence against others and avoid their responsibility in victimising others. 31  That said 
acknowledging all those who suffer, including members of armed groups, for the purpose of 
victim reparation, may divest such individuals of their agency, political participation, and 
responsibility by framing their role in the conflict in terms of victimisation and passivity.32 
Accordingly a nuanced approach is needed to reflect that some individuals can be both 
victimised and victimiser. It is only through developing a ‘thicker’ multi-perspective of 
victimisation can we understand how to address such harms in terms of reparations.33  
This article takes a critical approach by recognising individuals, such as the UDA 
member Michael Morrison killed in the Shankill bombing, as complex victims to avoid 
acknowledgement becoming a source of victimisation, but also appreciates the responsibility 
of such individuals and a more ‘thicker’ understanding of complex victims in delivering 
appropriate reparations. Although theorisation of complex victims is likely to only apply to a 
select category of individuals, such an approach is merited as by not recognising them it may 
lead to three problems: (1) contributing to narratives that they deserved such suffering or such 
violence was justified and further entrenching victim stereotypes; (2) preventing the application 
of reparations to vulnerable or marginalised groups, weakening the purpose of reparations to 
                                                             
29 Morrissey and Smyth n.8, p4; and Huyse n.23, p62. 
30 Morrissey and Smyth ibid., p7. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Jemima Garcia-Godos, Victim Reparations in the Peruvian Truth Commission and the Challenge of 
Historical Interpretation, International Journal of Transitional Justice 2(1) (2008) 63-82,.p79. 
33 Kieran McEvoy, Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice, Journal 
of Law and Society 34(4) (2007) 411-440. 
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effectively remedy harm; and (3) undermining the long term prospects of peace by leaving 
such suffering unaccounted and unresolved.34  
For the purposes of this article the complex identity of victim-perpetrator (complex 
victims) refers to individuals who are members of non-state armed, paramilitary or terrorist 
groups, or state forces who commit political violence, but have been victimised through 
identifiable international crimes, such as disappearances, extrajudicial killings, sexual 
violence, torture, serious injured, or ill-treatment caused by other actors. These crimes are 
distinguished due to their jus cogens nature that they are considered in international 
customary law as objectively illegal and can never be justified in their commission, no matter 
the background or association of an individual.35 Including complex victims in reparations 
mechanisms may cause political instability, as the case in Northern Ireland, but legally and 
morally there are grounds to include such individuals. Even though complex victims may be 
responsible for committing atrocities, it does not place them outside the law or access to an 
effective remedy for their suffering, as they still have ‘moral worth and dignity’.36 As such 
private law and human rights law, discussed further below, do not apply the doctrine of clean 
hands for intentional trespasses against the person or serious human rights violations.37 
This definition of complex victims as eligible for reparations is likely to exclude those 
who suffer by their own hands or from violations that do not rise to the severity of torture or 
sexual violence. In the case of the Shankill bombing with Thomas Begley (IRA), Sean Kelly 
(IRA) and Michael Morrison (UDA) were all members of paramilitary groups that carried out 
violence, and were all killed or injured, but it is likely that only Morrison suffered unlawful 
violence by another and could be considered a complex victim, with the family of Begley as 
                                                             
34 Bouris n.19, p75.  
35  M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, Law and 
Contemporary Problems 59 (1996) 63-74. 
36 Ernesto Verdeja, A Normative Theory of Reparations in Transitional Democracies, in C. Card and 
A.T. Marsoobian (eds.), Genocide’s Aftermath: Responsibility and Repair, Wiley-Blackwell (2007), 166-
185, p178. 
37 See Lisa Laplante, The Law of Remedies and the Clean Hands Doctrine: Exclusionary Reparation 
Policies in Peru's Political Transition, American University International Law Review, 23(1) (2007), 51-
90. 
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indirect victims, due to the loss of a loved one. Temporality is an important consideration, in 
that complex victims are perpetrators first then victimised, in comparison to victims, who are 
victimised without any fault of their own. The difference being that with complex victims, they 
are victimised due to their belonging to an armed or illegal group that is committing atrocities, 
but end up suffering unlawful force. Whereas innocent victims are victimised, but are not 
responsible for their suffering. It is only through recognising such victimisation in a non-
discriminatory way can the objectively wrongful nature of such violence be enforced through 
accountability mechanisms. Reparations are a key justice process in such issues as they 
acknowledging the suffering caused by offering different remedial measures by responsible 
actors to repair the harm caused, it is worth discussing its use in transitional justice in more 
detail. 
B. Constructing reparations for complex victims in times of 
transition 
Reparations are an important part of many transitional justice processes, both in alleviating 
victims’ suffering and to balance concessions and demobilisation packages made to 
combatants.38 For victims reparations are important in acknowledging and remedying their 
suffering, as well as providing more tangible means to improve their quality of life. 39  
Reparations in transitional justice can be rooted in diverse goals of accountability, 
reconciliation and peace building, masking tensions between them in practice.40 Reparations 
can also be contentious owing to competing demands, in particular from victims who are seen 
as key stakeholders due to their suffering. However, victims are at best consultees, not 
decision-makers in transitional justice as other parties and societal interests have to be 
                                                             
38  See Pablo de Greiff, DDR and Reparations: Establishing Links Between Peace and Justice 
Instruments, in K. Ambos, J. Large, and M. Wierda (eds.), Building a Future on Peace and Justice, 
(Springer 2009), 321-355; and the Final Report of Sierra Leone Truth Commission, Vol.II, Chapter 4, 
paras.34-39, and 69. 
39 TRC Report, Vol.V, Chapter 5, p174. 
40  Christine Bell, Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 3(1) (2009) 5-27. 
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considered.41 A key issue is how victimhood and eligibility for reparations is constructed both 
in terms of process and outcome during times of transition. 
Reparations in countries undergoing transition are not perfect. Such programmes can 
be distinguished as a political project by managing different political discourses and distributive 
justice concerns, such as maximising benefits to society through the allocation of resources 
in the aftermath of collective violence.42 Reparation processes can send political messages 
about the value of certain individuals and their inclusion within the new political order, 
rebuilding civic trust with the state and its citizens.43 Yet as Teitel suggests, the harm caused 
to individuals and society is ‘potentially limitless’.44 Some countries tend to prioritise certain 
suffering over others, on the basis of using resources efficiently when adopting reparations 
programmes. Most programmes concentrate on those vulnerable individuals and groups who 
continue to suffer from the physical, psychological or economic consequences of collective 
violence, such as disappearances, extrajudicial executions, sexual violence, torture, and 
serious injuries.45  
Determining who can claim reparations in countries that have experienced mass 
violence is a politically fraught process.46 The mass scale of victimisation caused by collective 
violence raises logistical challenges in how beneficiaries can be demarcated so as to ensure 
that a reparation mechanism is effective and meaningful to them. This evinces Veitch’s 
asymmetrical nature of law that it is unable to effectively hold all those responsible to account 
for the mass suffering caused.47 The law instead ‘organises irresponsibility’ enabling contested 
notions of victimhood to prevail by prioritising responses to certain victims over others. The                                                              
41 See Luke Moffett, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court, (Routledge 2014), p31. 
42 Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in P. de Greiff (ed.) The Handbook of Reparations, (OUP 
2006), 451-477, p454. 
43 Ibid.; Brandon Hamber, The dilemma's of reparations: In search of a process-driven approach, n K. 
De Feyter, S. Parmentier, M. Bossuyt and P. Lemmens (eds.), Out of the Ashes: Reparation for Victims 
of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations, Intersentia, (2006), 135-149, p141-142. 
44 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice, (OUP 2002), p134. 
45 In Sierra Leone, see TRC Final Report Vol. II, Chapter 4; Chega! The Report of the Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR), (2006) Part 10, para.175; and the Final 
Report of the Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, (2013) Vol. IV, p97-122. 
46 Huyse n.23, p58. 
47 Scott Veitch, Law and Irresponsibility: On the Legitimation of Human Suffering, Routledge-Cavendish 
(2007), p31. 
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development of legal rules and institutions for reparations can also act as a form of social 
control of suffering, rather than holding those responsible to account or acknowledging all 
suffering.48 This was apparent in the case of Argentina, where reparations were considered 
‘blood money’ by the Madres de Plaza de Mayo as a substitute for justice and truth processes. 
As Moon points out the victims’ acceptance of reparations would have to embrace the 
government’s narrative of the past of the ‘two devils’ of state and guerrilla violence, legitimising 
the state’s use of torture and disappearances.49 Given the scale of collective violence and the 
contested political narratives, providing reparations can be challenging to ‘innocent’ victims, 
never mind complex ones. In light of the economic and political constraints surrounding 
reparations, complex victims are likely to be the first excluded. Yet, the exclusion of certain 
victims can undermine other goals of reparations, such as reconciliation.50 
The issue of complex identities of victims has not really featured much within 
transitional justice theorisation of reparations. As Fletcher states, 
Victims are never a simple, unidimensional category, either in terms of their own 
complex needs or in terms of the fluidity of identities that characterize an ongoing 
conflict…. The constructed nature of victims in transitional justice works against 
addressing the complex nature of victims’ experiences and identities. They may hold 
multiple and conflicting views, certainly collectively but also individually, that 
transitional justice is ill equipped to address.51 
 
The absence of complex victims from reparations can be partly explained on the basis that 
many countries with reparation programmes were constructed around atrocities committed by 
the former authoritarian regime, such as in Latin America and South Africa. This dominance 
of state abuses has pervaded the theorising of reparations, meaning that more complex 
victimisation by both state and non-state actors has been neglected. Moreover, the state-
centred nature of human rights law has dominated the field of reparations, being concerned 
with the responsibility of the state to meet its international obligations under such treaties to 
                                                             
48 See Claire Moon, ‘Who’ll Pay Reparations on My Soul?’ Compensation, Social Control and Social 
Suffering, Social and Legal Studies 21(2) (2012) 187-199. 
49 Ibid., p194. 
50 Heidy Rombouts, Victim Organisations and the Politics of Reparation: A Case-Study on Rwanda 
(Intersentia 2004), p496. 
51 Laurel Fletcher, Editorial Note, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 8(1) (2014), 1–5, p2-3. 
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its citizens. Although a human rights approach, discussed further below, promotes non-
discrimination for gross violations, its focus on the state leaves little space for horizontal or 
overlapping responsibility of members of non-state organisations. Determining the 
responsibility for state abuses can be easier to identify, as it is an anonymous entity, civilians 
are generally acknowledged as victims.52 There remain challenges in providing reparations to 
complex victims. The following sub-section discusses the political contention around 
reparations for complex victims, before moving onto examine how different context have tried 
to deal with the issue. 
1. Reparations for innocent and complex victims 
The latent nature of complex victims in the transitional justice reparations literature can also 
be explained by them coming into conflict with demands of other victims or public perceptions. 
From a critical victimological perspective complex victims are unseen and unheard, as their 
suffering does not fit into socially accepted values of innocence and law-abiding citizens. As 
outlined at the start of this article in relation to the Shankill bombing, ‘innocent’ victims, such 
as civilians, may find it abhorrent that those who victimised them or others are eligible for 
reparations. The public may share such sentiments, which can impact the political viability of 
recognising complex victims for reparations. Starzyk et al suggest that reparations are more 
likely to be publicly accepted or sociably feasible where they do not compromise social 
values.53 Nussio et al also point to other factors that prompt reparations, such as more left-
leaning political ideology or group-based or collective guilt, together underscoring the 
significance of public support in the viability and sustainability of reparations.54 At least in 
Colombia context, Nussio et al research suggests that the social desirability of redress is 
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connected to moral determinations of victimhood with 70% of respondents supportive of 
reparations where only innocent victims received them.55  
Complex victims are often excluded from reparations on the grounds of avoiding ‘moral 
equivalence’ with innocent victims. In the sense that complex victims should be denied access 
to reparations as they took up arms against their fellow country men and women, thereby 
contrary to the ideal victim of being a good citizen and ‘innocent’ of any wrongdoing. This 
distinction may also be a means for such ‘innocent’ victims to find some sort of order in the 
aftermath of such traumatic experience that reparations validate their blamelessness in their 
suffering, and maintain the myopic view of the wrongfulness of a perpetrator.56 Therefore a 
‘hierarchy of victims’ can arise, with those ‘innocent’ or ‘real’ victims prioritised to facilitate 
political narratives of blame and innocence during the conflict.57 Such moral arguments can 
feed victim competition with each other for recognition, material resources or symbolic 
gestures, such as monuments, so as exclude complex victims as undeserving.58 Engaging in 
arguments about moral equivalence and hierarchies of victims, politicises the nature of 
suffering, undermining individuals’ personal loss and the effectiveness of reparations to 
remedy harm.59 Instead of vertical ‘hierarchies’ of victimhood, Rombouts et al. suggest it is 
more appropriate to conceptualise suffering horizontally to allow differentiation, without 
denying recognition of certain individuals, groups, or characteristics.60  
There is a danger in theorising reparations and implementing them in practice for 
‘innocent victims’, it may exclude those complex victims who have suffered from comparable 
harm.61 By allowing their suffering to remain unacknowledged it perpetuates impunity for such 
crimes against certain individuals, undermining the jus cogens nature of such violations and                                                              
55 Ibid. p352. 
56 See Judith L. Herman, Trauma and Recovery: From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror, River Oram 
Press (1994). 
57 See Bouris n.19; and McEvoy and McConnachie n.22, p532.  
58 Huyse n.23, p64. 
59 Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, Washington Square Press (1985), p99; and Herman 
n.52. 
60 Heidy Rombouts, Pietro Sardaro and Stef Vandeginste, The right to reparation for victims of gross 
and systematic violations of human rights, in Feyter et al. n.51, 455-499, p470. 
61 See Cristíán Correa, Inter-American Court's Dangerous Precedent in Limiting Insurgents' Right to 
Reparations, JusticeInfo.net, 2nd September 2015. 
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denying the dignity of complex victims. Similarly if only ‘innocent victims’ are dealt with through 
reparations mechanisms and perpetrators through demobilisation programmes and/or criminal 
processes, it may further homogenise both groups, legally categorising them into opposing 
entities, which could inhibit reconciliation and sustainable peace. Such a simplistic legal 
typology may fail to reflect the reality of individuals’ lived experience where over time they 
could traverse both identities, or obtain other roles, such as peacemaker. The final section of 
this article posits that the law during transition can be crafted to encompass such complex 
identities, while maintaining goals of accountability and reconciliation for reparations.62 
Complex victims are different from ‘innocent’ victims in that they are responsible for 
victimising others. This requires a more nuanced approach in reconciling their responsibility 
with acknowledging their victimisation. In the case of the Shankill bombing, Michael Morrison 
(UDA), can be considered a complex victim, as although he was involved in an illegal 
paramilitary group, he was unlawfully killed in the bombing and would likely be eligible for 
reparations. In contrast the IRA bombers Thomas Begley and Sean Kelly, who were 
respectfully killed and injured, would not be considered complex victims as they were harmed 
by their own conduct in planting the bomb. Private law principles would prevent an individual 
for claiming a remedy he/she had caused by their own hand. 63 A further distinction could be 
made between direct and indirect victims, i.e. family members of the bombers as indirect 
complex victims but not the bombers. The responsibility of the bomber does not transfer to 
their family, who have suffered a loss, such as Begley’s family. However, given that the 
bomber caused harm to others, the family as indirect victims would only be eligible for more 
general assistance or services, such as rehabilitation, as they would be unable to establish 
harm suffered by unlawful actions of another. Distinguishing innocent from complex victims not 
only brings into question whether they should benefit from reparations, but also what 
procedural role complex victims play in the negotiation, consultation and process of 
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reparations programmes. Accordingly the purpose of this article is to explore how a more 
nuanced picture of acknowledgement and responsibility can be developed in reparation 
programmes to respond to complex victimisation in periods of transition, without diluting the 
meaning of victimhood and the remedial nature of reparations. 
2. Reconciling acknowledgement and responsibility of complex 
victims 
Recognising complex victims as beneficiaries and responsible actors for reparations has to 
generally fit into the transitional political project. Where complex victims are able to access 
reparations it is seen to be congruent with the dominant political narrative of the wrongfulness 
of the state’s actions or encouraging reconciliation, such as in Chile and Sierra Leone.64 In 
Argentina and Brazil reparations were legally framed around human rights violations 
committed by state actors, thereby automatically excluding victims of non-state actors from 
the outset.65 That said violence by non-state actors in Argentina and Brazil was diminutive in 
comparison to atrocities committed by state forces. In other transitional justice contexts 
reparations can be as Hazan suggests ‘transactional’, such as the case with South Africa 
where ‘the perpetrators obtained amnesty, and the victims received reparations in 
exchange.’66  Borer and others have highlighted that in South Africa this dichotomy did not 
capture the composite grey zone of identities, nor ‘perpetrators [who] are simultaneously 
victims’.67 A number of complex victims were recommended by the TRC for reparations.68 In 
contrast to the transitional justice literature on reparations that concentrates on authoritarian 
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regimes or state violations, the rest of this section discusses how complex victims have been 
included and excluded from reparation programmes in situations closer to internal armed 
conflict, where state and non-state actors committed violence in the contexts of Colombia, 
Peru and Northern Ireland. 
In Colombia the 2005 Justice and Peace Law constructs victimhood and primary 
responsibility for reparations around crimes committed by illegal armed groups, avoiding the 
responsibility of the state in atrocities. Only in the 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law could 
claims be made against state forces, after pressure by victim groups on the Colombian 
government.69 That said the 2011 Law excludes members of illegal groups from claiming 
reparations to deny the legitimacy of their struggle, despite some of them suffering from gross 
violations of human rights.70 Children or minors in such groups do however have access to 
reparations if they are minors at the time of demobilisation.71 Furthermore, family members 
and dependents of members of non-state armed groups are able to claim reparations as direct 
victims of violations, but not for indirect victimisation where violations are committed against 
members of armed groups.72 This is in contrast to members of the Colombian armed forces 
who are recognised as victims with access to reparations, without any distinction with those 
who are responsible for committing violations.73 For those individuals killed by state forces, a 
criminal investigation needs to be completed to determine that the person was not a member 
of an illegal armed group to claim reparations. Yet these investigations rarely reach a 
conclusion, with the effect of excluding numerous victims from reparations in attempt to 
establish ‘innocence’.74  
In Peru controversy remains around complex victims claiming reparations. The Peruvian 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) recommended reparations, which were 
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implemented by the Comprehensive Reparation Programme (PIR). The CVR defined victims 
broadly to include those who suffered human rights violations, thereby embracing individuals 
who belonged to ‘subversive’ non-state groups. However, the CVR excluded members of 
subversive groups who suffered harm in armed clashes from reparations, as they took up 
arms against the democratic government and were subjected to legitimate force by the state.  
As such, they were ‘victims, but not beneficiaries’.75 Although such reasoning is compliant with 
domestic and international law on the use of force and human rights, it presupposed that such 
force was legitimate. Furthermore, such presumption on the legitimacy of state violence allows 
state forces to be included as ‘victims’ in reparation programmes on the basis that they were 
protecting the community, despite documented widespread and systematic human rights 
abuses.76  
The distinction between state and non-state actors is present in the PIR reparation 
scheme. The PIR scheme offers both individual and collective reparations, but the delivery of 
individual reparations has been delayed to identify and exclude members of illegal armed 
groups.  It has taken years to screen applicants to avoid members of subversive groups 
benefitting from reparations.77 This approach also risks excluding many individuals in Peru 
who were wrongly convicted of membership of illegal armed groups, but allow those who were 
never identified to access reparations. 78  Such a broad distinction prevents vulnerable 
individuals within such communities to access an effective remedy, such as children who were 
members of illegal groups at the time.79 This brings into question the remedial effect and 
contribution to reconciliation of reparations when they can be a source of victimisation by 
excluding individuals of grave atrocities. 
In contrast to these contexts, discussions on reparations in Northern Ireland in dealing 
with the past have been virtually non-existent, given the contested nature of which victims 
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should be acknowledged and who is responsible, with greater attention on truth and justice.80 
As mentioned above, in 2009 the Consultative Group on the Past (CGP) was established to 
find solutions to dealing with past in Northern Ireland. The final report of the CGP recognised 
the shortcomings of compensation for the harm caused by the conflict, and recommended that 
a ‘one-off ex-gratia recognition payment’ of £12,000 be paid to the relatives of those killed 
during the conflict, to acknowledge the loss they have endured. 81 Nonetheless, this one 
recommendation proved politically controversial, as the family of bombers, such as Thomas 
Begley, would be eligible with no account of their responsibility, it resulted in the whole report 
being rejected. More recent proposals of a pension for those severely injured during the 
Troubles and their carers, have been appropriated by some politicians wanting to ensure that 
only ‘innocent’ victims can avail of the pension, despite the serious suffering of complex victims 
and the likelihood that only a handful of them would be eligible.82 Such proposals stand in 
stark contrast to demobilisation packages and damages paid to members of the security 
forces, again applied without any distinction as in the Colombian and Peruvian contexts.83 
In these different contexts we can see that who is acknowledged as a victim is 
politically contested. It is apparent in Northern Ireland and Peru that the discourse of 
victimhood and innocence is used by elites to advance their political agenda to seize the 
apparent moral high ground and narrative of the conflict. That said a more nuanced picture 
emerges in the distinction between complex victims and their family members (indirect 
victims).  In the context of Colombia, indirect victims are allowed to claim reparations for a 
complex victim who is killed, despite if they were instead alive and tortured or seriously injured 
they would be denied such remedial measures. Such a distinction reflects the personal 
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responsibility of the complex victim to exclude their access to redress, which does not extend 
to their family members. 
In terms of responsibility there are two broad approaches. In South Africa there was a 
more unified picture of responsibility, with amnesty for individuals and the state assumes 
responsibility for reparations, reflecting a wider discourse on reconciliation.84 Nonetheless, 
such a myopic view of responsibility is a legal fiction, which covers up the messy reality of the 
complex web of victimisation and responsibility that characterises collective violence, where 
individuals, states and non-state actors can be responsible for violations that may give rise to 
obligations for reparations. This narrow construction of responsibility could undermine the 
legitimacy and acceptance of reparations by some victims. In contrast the Colombian 
experience represents a more multifaceted approach to responsibility, where the state, armed 
groups and individuals can be held responsible for violations that can arise to obligations for 
reparation. 85  This more composite approach to responsibility better embraces the lived 
experienced of collective violence and is better positioned to support a more accurate 
accountability process. That said when it comes to excluding complex victims from reparations 
on the basis of their responsibility it endangers slowing down the process and excluding 
numerous other victims who suffer from gross violations of human rights.  
The distinction of responsibility is tied to underlying discourses of legitimacy, whereby 
state security forces are still able to claim reparations, with no examination of their 
responsibility in victimising others. Such a construct maintains the ‘order’ of state forces, by 
minimising the wrongfulness of state. As situations of internal armed conflict, it stands in 
contrast to reparations under authoritarian regimes. The general distinction between ‘ideal 
victims’ of victimised innocent civilians and state forces serving their community who are able 
to claim reparations, against the suffering of complex victims, reinforces a hierarchy of victims, 
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where some suffering is deserved and there is no equal value for human life, dignity, and 
personal integrity.86 The broad brush of responsibility to exclude acknowledgement of the 
serious suffering of such individuals, paints over complex identities and experiences of 
individuals during collective violence. This represents a ‘double-bind’, which excludes complex 
victims from reparations on the basis of their responsibility, yet includes state forces without 
examining their culpability. Accordingly, by excluding complex victims a legal fiction is created 
where only certain victims in the official narrative of the conflict deserve to benefit from 
reparations. Perhaps rather than exclusion, alternative perspectives could be considered to 
learn how responsibility and victimisation of complex victims can be reconciled. 
C. Navigating conflicting identities 
Complex identities of victim-perpetrators can be navigated through other mechanisms. This 
section examines how claims over identity are dealt with through reparations in human rights 
law and development or services offered to affected communities. The human rights approach 
comes into sharper conflict with socio-political constructions of victimhood and eligibility for 
reparations of victim-perpetrators as it is only concerned with the responsibility of the state; 
whereas the provision of assistance or services takes a more nuanced perspective. Ultimately 
these alternative approaches to state administrative reparation mechanisms narrowly 
construe victim-perpetrators responsibility or over look it entirely. At the same time such 
alternatives can encourage states to include complex victims in reparation programmes or at 
least alleviate their suffering through more discreet assistance. 
1. Human Rights and Reparations 
Reparations have long been associated in human rights law as remedial measures to ‘promote 
justice by redress’.87 The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparations (UNBPG) defines ‘victim’ broadly to include direct and indirect victims who suffer 
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harm. 88  Principle 25 further stipulates that reparations should be applied ‘without any 
discrimination of any kind or on any ground, without exception.’ Shelton elaborates that the 
‘character of the victim should not be considered because it is irrelevant to the wrong and to 
the remedy, and implies a value judgement on the worth of an individual that has nothing to 
do with the injury suffered.’ 89  Otherwise this would undermine the objectivity of such a 
determination by basing such decisions on moral, rather than legal responsibility. 90 This 
principle of ‘non-discrimination’ is consistent with cases of torture, whereby the prohibition of 
such ill-treatment is absolute, no matter the political context or character of the individual.91 
As such, complex victims who suffer from gross violations of human rights are human beings 
who have a right to reparations, no matter their responsibility, which should not prevent their 
access to a remedy. 
 Although the non-discrimination principle is prevalent in contemporary human rights 
law for complex victims of gross violations, this has not always been the case. The European 
Court of Human Rights in the past has distinguished complex victims from claiming 
reparations. In McCann and others v United Kingdom British special forces killed three 
members of the IRA in Gibraltar, who were planning to detonate a bomb at a military parade. 
The Court found that while the use of force was not ‘absolutely necessary’ and their right to 
life had been violated, the families of those killed were not entitled to reparations as the Court 
stated itself, ‘having regard to the fact that the three terrorist suspects who were killed had 
been intending to plant a bomb in Gibraltar, the Court does not consider it appropriate to make 
an award.’92 In more recent decisions the Court has not distinguished complex victims, instead 
focusing on whether the state carried out an effective investigation, rather than a factual 
analysis of whether individuals’ substantive right to life had been violated.93 Considering the 
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disproportionate use of force in the McCann case, it is likely that the claim of reparations could 
be decided differently today.  In 2013 the Grand Chamber in the Del Río Prada v Spain case 
disregarded the applicant’s background in ETA, being more concerned with the Spanish 
government’s breach of its obligation under Article 5(1) on lawful detention.94 In other cases 
the Court not entirely avoiding the context of violations and moving to remedying individual, 
leaves the door open to consider the actions and responsibility of complex victims on nebulous 
grounds of ‘equity’.95 
In contrast, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has until relatively recently 
followed the non-discrimination principle, as apparent in a number of cases involving Peruvian 
state forces violating the rights of members of non-state armed groups. In one of the most 
notable cases, Miguel Castro Castro Prison v Peru state forces attacked a high security prison 
housing Shining Path inmates, killing 41 and injuring 175 others, and then failed to conduct 
an effective investigation.96 Although the Peruvian government partially acknowledged its 
responsibility for those killed and injured during the attack, it was unwilling to recognise those 
members of the Shining Path as victims for the purposes of reparation. It instead requested 
the Inter-American Court to place such violations in the ‘context’ of an ‘extremely serious 
situation of internal conflict’, with reparations to be determined in line with domestic policies.97 
However, the Court rejected these claims and awarded substantial compensation to victims 
and their next of kin, as well as for the state to provide other forms of reparations.98 
In subsequent proceedings on interpretation of the judgment in Miguel Castro Castro 
Prison, the Peruvian government sought to push their point that the victims as convicted 
members of the Shining Path were responsible for victimising Peruvians and the Court should 
respect the memory of those they victimised. Furthermore, the government suggested that by 
                                                             
94 Cf. Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Villiger, Steiner, Power-Forde, Lemmens and Griţco in 
Del Río Prada v Spain, Application no. 42750/09, 21 October 2013.  
95 Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom, (Application no. 55721/07), 7 July 2011, para.182. 
96 Miguel Castro Castro Prison v Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment 25 November 2006, 
Series C No.160.  
97 Ibid., paras.135 and 142. 
98 Ibid., paras.410-469. 
24 
 
awarding reparations to such complex victims it would allow the Shining Path to continue its 
subversive campaign; instead such reparation should be off-set as a debt to those they had 
victimised.99 Nonetheless, the Court refused to reduce or prevent reparations to the victims, 
on the basis that as a human rights court it lacked the jurisdiction to determine the nature and 
aggravating circumstances of their criminal acts, distinguishing it from a criminal court and 
determining individual criminal responsibility.100 Instead the jurisdiction of the Court was to 
examine the international responsibility of the Peruvian state in fulfilling its obligations under 
the American Convention, which could not be mitigated by the actions of the victims, owing to 
the serious nature of the violations. On the one hand this reflects the shortcomings of a human 
rights court in dealing with internal armed conflicts, which go beyond the responsibility of the 
state and the handful of victims that are able to come before such proceedings to seek redress.  
Yet on the other hand, it vindicates the dignity and right to remedy for complex victims that 
they should not have been subjected to such wrongful atrocities. 
Human rights jurisprudence is important in two respects in the difficulty of reparations 
in providing a just solution in dealing with complex victims: non-discrimination; and state 
responsibility. With the first issue human rights courts generally follow the principle of non-
discrimination when it comes to holding the state responsible for violating human rights 
obligations. Thus regional human rights courts generally take a more objective analysis. 
However, the right to reparation as vindication of individuals who have been subjected to gross 
human rights violations is problematic in applying to members of non-state armed groups who 
are victimised by the state. This leads to the second issue that human rights courts struggle 
with their one-dimensional jurisdictional reach as enforcing the obligations of the state, 
preventing it from examining the responsibility of private individuals and groups. This inability 
to distinguish the responsibility of complex victims could cause political strife, as only a handful 
of victims are able to access regional human rights courts, causing an imbalance between 
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those before the court and the majority of victims’ reliant on national mechanisms. 
Unsurprisingly reparations determined in regional human rights courts in times of internal 
armed conflict can have a significant political impact on the domestic transitional justice 
landscape, as in the case of Peru.101 Perhaps as a result of this domestic political pressure 
two recent cases before the Inter-American Court perhaps reflect that the court is becoming 
more sensitive to state arguments on complex victims and the legitimacy of its reparation 
orders, by limiting compensation or awarding only rehabilitation to family members of hostage 
takers extra-judicially killed by state forces.102 
Ultimately the human rights approach by itself fails to capture the larger complex web 
of victimisation and responsibility that characterises collective violence. In general human 
rights law represents important moral values inherent in a rights based approach, but perhaps 
does not sufficiently countenance the more complex political and social values in constructing 
reparations after internal armed conflict. In the sense that human rights law affirms individuals 
who are subjected to gross violations of human rights or international crimes should have a 
right to an effective remedy, no matter their conduct. However, for those individuals and 
groups that complex victims are responsible for victimising, they may have to provide 
reparations to their victims, but they should have a similar right to remedy against those who 
victimised them, i.e. the state.  
2. Development aid, services and community reparations as a 
workaround? 
In contrast to individual rights and awards of reparations in human rights law, states have 
grouped victims and affected communities together to provide more general assistance and 
remedial programmes to them, in part to maximise resources and to avoid issues of moral 
equivalence with complex victims. Development aid, services and community reparations 
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have been promoted in the context of collective violence to provide assistance and support to 
victims. These more collective responses can be more nuanced, avoiding questions of 
benefitting complex victims, as they assist not just victims, but everyone in a particular area. 
Moreover such approaches can be more inclusive not just in their outcomes, but also in the 
decision-making processes, enabling communities better ownership and oversight of their 
design.103 However, such an approach can dilute the reparative effect of reparations by 
removing responsibility from the equation and widening the scope of application to those who 
have not been victimised.104 
The first type of general assistance is development, which is generally humanitarian in 
nature to improve the situation of the general population affected by violence by providing 
them their basic needs. In Uganda development and demobilisation packages have been the 
principle measures for support to victims. In terms of development the government has often 
declared these programmes are reparations, such as Northern Ugandan Social Action Fund 
(NUSF) and the Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP).105 Yet, these programmes 
involve reconstruction of infrastructure and development of social services to the general 
population, but they do not specifically remedy or acknowledge the harm suffered by victims 
and seek to remedy their harm. Moreover, such development avoids the responsibility of the 
state in atrocities its forces committed.  
The northern Uganda conflict also created a large grey zone of complex victims, where 
tens of thousands of individuals were abducted by the LRA or organised in to local self-
defence units by the government.106 The Amnesty Act 2000 enabled individuals who were 
members of the LRA (including those abducted) to return without fear of prosecution and to 
avail of a demobilisation package. Yet by absolving all individuals of reparations and providing 
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ex-combatants assistance, it has caused resentment amongst other victims and communities, 
as one Northern Ugandan said, ‘I am a victim, but I do not have the benefits of a perpetrator 
who is also a victim.’107 In all the provision of demobilisation packages to perpetrators and 
general assistance to affected communities, reflects that the needs of victims are neglected 
and undermines notions of transactional agreements being made between different 
stakeholders in dealing with the past.108 
The second type of general assistance is services. In Northern Ireland, a service-based 
approach has dominated provision to victims and survivors’ needs. As a result of the Good 
Friday Agreement and subsequent reports in to provisions for victims, funds were established 
to support victims through numerous victim groups.109 Beneficiaries of such schemes are 
based on a broad definition of victim as ‘someone who is or has been physically or 
psychologically injured, [provides substantial amount of care for such a person, or bereaved] 
as a result of or in consequence of a conflict-related incident’.110 The inclusive nature of the 
definition was intentional to avoid contention over eligibility for service provision, reflecting 
more humanitarian concerns than accountability.111 Services provided to victims are funded 
now through the Victims and Survivors Service (VSS), and reviewed through the Commission 
for Victims and Survivors.112 However, the service basis of support to victims is based on 
budgetary allocations by the local Northern Ireland government, making such provision 
discretionary without any long-term commitment. In terms of accountability such measures do 
not publicly acknowledge individuals as victims, as service provision loses the recognition, 
entitlement and responsibility aspects associated with reparations, by their delivery through 
groups. In terms of remedy, services provided have been criticised for their access issues, 
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location, standard of provision, and ability to respond to victims’ needs. 113 Nevertheless, 
complex victim, such as former paramilitaries or state agents who were victimised, are able to 
access services through groups, due to the broad and non-discriminatory definition of 
victimhood. 
The third type of general assistance is community reparations, which are measures 
awarded to groups or communities identified as having suffered and can include symbolic 
measures, such as memorials. Community reparations can be more cost effective in offering 
acknowledgement to affected communities, rather than individual monetary awards. These 
awards can avoid victim competition by applying equally to all those victimised, thereby 
avoiding a hierarchy of suffering sometimes associated with compensation.114 They can also 
potentially benefit other victims who cannot provide evidence of their suffering for the purpose 
of individual compensation, but can benefit from the construction of a health centre in an area. 
In Peru and Colombia community collective reparations have complemented individual awards 
by broadening out the benefits of redress to a wider group of beneficiaries.115 
Community reparation can be a double-edged sword, as they risk compromising 
individual victims’ right to a remedy and benefiting those who were not victimised. In Peru, 
while members of the Shining Path are excluded from individual reparations, they are able to 
benefit from reparations awarded to communities. 116  In the Lubanga case before the 
International Criminal Court, some victims criticised that community measures suggested by 
the Trial Chamber were inappropriate, given that the community ‘accepted this behaviour [the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers in the Ituri conflict] for the most part and supported the 
leaders who engaged in it. Many even collaborated.’117 As a result in the Kenyan case of Ruto 
and Sang, at least 47 victims pulled out of participating at the Court on the basis that 
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reparations would be ordered to the community, meaning that perpetrators who continue to 
live near victims would be able to benefit from the harm they caused.118 On appeal the Court 
in the Lubanga case changed reparations from community awards to collective measures to 
identifiable victims, rather than the broader community, so that those who suffered harm could 
have some form of collective remedy based on Mr Lubanga criminal conviction, i.e. use of 
child soldiers.119 
Development, services and community reparations offer alternative nuanced ways to 
approach assisting and remedying the harm suffered by all individuals without making 
distinctions in terms of responsibility. This in itself may promote reconciliation and peace, 
rather than accountability. These different approaches reflect the different goals of reparations 
and assistance to victims in times of transition. Nevertheless, such ambiguity of victimhood 
and responsibility undermines the meaningfulness of reparations as an effective remedy and 
as a means of accountability. The distinction of victims from other individuals and groups is 
important in acknowledging serious suffering and providing measures that try to as far as 
possible remedy the harmful consequences. Although Dixon points out from a bottom-up 
perspective that victims may not distinguish individual reparations from assistance where they 
are delivered in the same form, i.e. monetary awards or collective development, reparations 
carry a strong symbolic component that brings them into the ‘politics of recognition’ of who is 
seen as deserving of publicly acknowledged redress.120 This can have an impact on the 
feasibility and implementation of reparations during transition. 
3. Acknowledging and redressing complex victims 
The human rights and development approaches represent two different ways to address 
reparations for complex victims. Human rights predominately does not discriminate against                                                              
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complex victims of gross violations, avoiding issues of responsibility of individuals, and 
concerned with remedying the harm caused by gross violations, but even this is subject to 
judicial discretion in each case, excluding some complex victims. In contrast development, 
services and community reparations are widely defined, but risk losing their remedial effect for 
victims. Moreover, development and services reinforce victims as vulnerable, dependent, 
objects of moral concern, undermining their agency and rights. Common to both is to ignore 
individual responsibility; yet by neglecting this important aspect it could cause secondary 
victimisation to those ‘innocent’ victims harmed by complex victims. Added to this, such 
universal acceptance of victimisation without any official distinction of responsibility could 
enable victimisers to legitimise the wrongs of the past and deny the experience of those who 
suffered. Thus while remedying the past can attach goals of reconciliation and peace, 
accountability remains a cornerstone of reparations in international law, which gives value to 
victims who seek it to have their own harm acknowledged and to hold those responsible to 
redress the harm they have caused. Nonetheless, such international norms need to be flexible 
and reflect legal pluralism where reparations may need to be shaped to domestic contexts and 
victims’ needs, so as to be socially feasible and acceptable. 
Conceivably there is another way between recognising victimisation and responsibility. 
Such an approach would require an inclusive approach to acknowledge victimisation caused 
by gross violations of human rights, allowing states the flexibility to prioritise those who cause 
the most acute and continuing suffering, i.e. disappearances, torture, extrajudicial killings, and 
sexual violence. Responsibility of complex victims would not exclude them from reparations, 
given the serious nature of the violence committed against them. They would however be 
limited to certain types of reparations, such as rehabilitation and pecuniary damages. Although 
this may create a hierarchy of victimhood, all those who suffered would be at least have their 
suffering acknowledged and access to some form of remedy. The difference would be to 
reflect that complex victims were involved in victimising others and so their redress should 
reflect their responsibility. For innocent victims it avoids reparations becoming a source of 
further victimisation by not equating them as the same as those who killed. Reparations may 
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create a hierarchy of victimhood based on suffering and responsibility, reflecting the messy 
reality of collective violence that not all victims or perpetrators are the same, where some got 
up in the morning to carry out their daily business, whereas others went out with the intention 
to kill or cause serious injury and must live with the consequences. That said limiting 
perpetrators from full reparation, perhaps does not capture the responsibility of facilitators or 
bystanders who allowed violence to occur.121 
Alternatively compensation awards could have a symbolic amount deducted, i.e. 10%, 
to reflect their responsibility in victimising others. A tariff scheme could reflect the gravity of 
the offence and time since the complex victim’s conviction and their victimisation, as well as 
their contribution to the peace process or reconciliation. Such reduction should be limited to a 
certain percentage (e.g. 30%) to maintain their reparative value to the complex victims, without 
undermining them as a remedy and symbolic worth. This is the emerging position from the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights where in the Colombian and Peruvian hostage cases 
compensation was reduced or reparations limited to rehabilitation for family members.122  
Another option may be to have a review panel that could assess complex victims, 
based on a series of criteria, such as gravity of the offence of which they were convicted, time 
since the crime, and continuing suffering. In the case of the Shankill bombing mentioned at 
the start of this article, a distinction could be made between the bomber Thomas Begley, who 
blew himself up, and the UDA paramilitary Michael Morrison who was killed as a result. Begley 
was responsible for killing himself, his suffering could be distinguished as being the result of 
unlawful violence caused by himself, thereby not eligible for certain reparations, such as 
compensation. As indirect victims, his family could avail of rehabilitation or collective 
reparations, such as inclusion of his name on a memorial, incorporating access to more 
general services and assistance to affected communities, than based on their victimisation. 
Whereas Morrison (UDA) could be included in compensation awards for being murdered, but 
as a member of an illegal armed group could have the compensation for his family reduced                                                              
121 This is beyond the scope of this article. See Borer n.7. 
122 See fn.115. 
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by a symbolic amount. Such a complex approach better captures the lived experience of 
individuals and groups in collective violence, which not only involves victims, perpetrators and 
complex victims, but also non-state and state actors. It is important in terms of legitimacy and 
to limit hierarchies of victimhood that the responsibility of individual members of state forces 
is examined when it comes to reparations. Although this complex approach is likely to increase 
the administrative and evidential workload of reparation mechanisms, it helps to neutralise, or 
at least manage, contested identities and redress in a reasoned and remedial way. 
D. Conclusion 
As transitional justice has traditionally been rooted in accountability we hold onto simplistic 
definitions of identity and responsibility to help make sense of senseless violence. Yet in life, 
violence and human behaviour do not lend themselves to such superficial distinctions of 
innocent victims and guilty perpetrators. In contrast a complex picture of victimisation and 
responsibility recognises that victims are not always innocent, but can be or become 
victimisers. This is not to deny their suffering or to say that some or all victims will be 
perpetrators. Rather the intention here is to acknowledge that victims are human beings who 
have suffered, and that some of them through their conduct or association are responsible for 
victimising others. This contention of identity is accentuated with reparations, which attempt 
to publicly remedy harm and acknowledge suffering by those responsible. As noted at the start 
of this article, failing to include complex victims within reparations mechanisms has the 
potential to reinforce innocent victim stereotypes, denying redress to those complex victims 
who have suffered from gross violations of human rights. This could undermine long-term 
prospects of peace by inhibiting remedial and accountability prospects, as well as broader 
goals of the transition of reconciliation and guarantees of non-recurrence of violence. For 
reparations to reconcile the acknowledgement and responsibility of complex victims it requires 
a more composite approach to accountability. 
Reparations in transitional justice usually developed through large administration 
programmes, are usually a more political project than a juridical one, still depend on whether 
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complex victims are deemed to ‘fit’ within the dominant political narrative that emerges from 
the transition. As such, the application and adherence of legal principles and rules is more 
flexible than that of a court. Just as identity in transitional societies can be used to construct 
legitimacy, so to can reparations. As a political project, given the asymmetry between suffering 
and the law’s ability to hold those responsible to account, reparations in transitional justice 
processes often involve the prioritisation of suffering of certain individuals and groups over 
others. Human rights law perhaps can provide guidance here in trying to remedy the harm 
suffered by gross violations of human rights, without distinction, but it gives little guidance on 
the responsibility of complex victims in victimising others.  
A more composite approach to complex victims entails recognising individuals who 
suffer from gross violations of human rights and allowing them to claim reparations, but such 
victims would have limited reparations or reduced compensation to reflect their responsibility 
in victimising others. This distinction of complex victims could make reparations to them more 
socially feasible and morally palatable. By affirming accountability as part of reparations we 
can hopefully depoliticise contentions around reparations for complex victims, by neither 
excluding them nor equating them with innocent victims, but insisting that every individual who 
suffers from mass atrocities has access to an effective remedy. Transitional justice at its core 
is concerned with transitioning societies away from violence. Key to this is transforming 
discourses of victimhood and violence into more nuanced and complex measures to remedy 
suffering and address responsibility. Failure to address serious victimisation in times of 
transition will leave the wounds of the past open to fester into new grievances and potentially 
legitimise the resurgence of violence. Complex victims, while ‘guilty’ or ‘bad’ victims, have still 
suffered serious harm and the new political order needs to be as inclusive as possible to 
comprehensively address the past. Reparations are a malleable transitional justice tool that 
can be crafted to deal with complex victimisation and stave off the return to violence. 
  
